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UNSEAWORTHINESS AND OPERATING NEGLIGENCE:
CONDITION VERSUS CAUSE—USNER V.
LUCKENBACH OVERSEAS CORP.
Unseaworthiness is the admiralty doctrine which imposes upon a
shipowner an absolute duty to maintain his ship and its appurtenances
in a manner reasonably suited for their intended use.' Judicial ex-
pansion of the doctrine during the past fifty years has led to its recogni-
tion as a bastion of seamen's rights. 2 Recently, however, the Supreme
Court, in Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas corp.,3 abruptly curtailed this
expansion by excluding a single act of operating negligence, or operating
negligence per se, from the scope of unseaworthiness liability. The
Court stressed that unseaworthiness is a condition, and although a
single act of operating negligence may affect the physical make-up
of the ship in such a manner as to create a condition of unsea-
worthiness, an act of operating negligence is not itself such a con-
dition. Initially this comment will trace the historical development of
the doctrine of unseaworthiness. The Usner decision will then be ana-
lyzed in light of this development in order to determine its proper
interpretation. Finally, related issues concerning the scope of unsea-
worthiness liability will be assessed in light of the Usner rationale.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Until recently, tort liability was not imposed upon a shipowner for
injuries suffered by a seaman and caused by the unseaworthiness of
the former's vessel. The shipowner's duty under the unseaworthiness
doctrine was limited to the ship's cargo and to coverage of the ship
under a contract of marine insurance.' To the owner of the cargo the
shipowner was under an absolute duty to provide a vessel which, at
the start of the voyage, would be reasonably fit to meet the exigencies
of the voyage. 5
 In addition, under the law of marine insurance the
1
 G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 316 (1.957) Chereinafter cited as G.
Gilmore & C. Black].
2 Id. at 316.
3 400 U.S. 494 (1971).
4
 Tetreauit, Seamen, Seaworthiness and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 Cornell
L. Q. 381, 394 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Tetreault]. The ensuing textual discussion will
focus on the unseaworthiness doctrine. The Usner decision deals with the relationship be-
tween operating negligence and unseaworthiness; see note 46 infra. The decision, and
therefore this comment, do not deal with the question of "instantaneous unseaworthiness,"
a purely transitory unseaworthy condition often caused by operating negligence. The
issues relating to instantaneous unseaworthiness are raised by the fact that the purely
transitory or instantaneous "condition" of unseaworthiness may be inseparable from
the operating negligence which caused it. In Usner no unseaworthy condition, not even
a transitory one, existed. For a complete treatment of this issue see Zobel, The Unsea-
worthy Instant, 45 St. John's L. Rev. 200 (1970). For a comprehensive discussion of the
entire range of seamen's rights, see generally Tetreault, supra.
5 Tetreault, supra note 4, at 394.
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shipowner was held to an absolute duty to provide a seaworthy ship as
a condition precedent to the attachment of a policy of marine insur-
ance; the seaworthiness of the vessel was considered a risk not assumed
by the insurer.' The shipowner's liability to crewmen was narrowly
limited to providing "maintenance and cure" (wages and medical carer
to crewmen whose injuries were not the result of their own misconduct.'
The shipowner bore no responsibility to them beyond his liability for
maintenance and cure, whether the injuries resulted from the negligence
of the shipowner and his employees or from the unseaworthiness of the
ship.°
Extension to seamen of the shipowner's duty to provide a sea-
worthy vessel is a relatively recent development." The duty of the
shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel for his seamen was originally
contractual in nature.11
 The seaman's contract of employment was
viewed as containing an implied condition that the vessel was sea-
worthy. The seaman could refuse to sail on an unseaworthy vessel and
the shipowner would nevertheless be liable to the seaman for the con-
tracted wages." This implied condition was of no value, however, to
the seaman injured as a result of the unseaworthiness of the vessel;
his remedy against the shipowner was limited to maintenance and cure.
Expansion of the doctrine from its genesis in the wage case con-
text to its present status was initiated by the Supreme Court in The
Osceola." The Court indicated, by way of dicta, that the shipowner
could be held liable to a seaman14
 far an indemnity beyond main-
tenance and cure for injuries caused by unseaworthiness of the
vessel which were attributable to the negligence of the shipowner."
While increasing the obligation of the shipowner to seamen with respect
6 Id. at 394-95.
7 G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, at 316.
8 Tetreauli, supra note 4, at 383.
o Id. An exception was made in the case of injuries received in defense of the ship
against pirates. The crewman so maimed or disabled was to receive an indemnity of life-
time maintenance. Id. at 384.
10 See G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, at 315-17.
11
 Tetreault, supra note 4, at 386, 390. In this context the terms seaman and crew-
man are synonymous. Compare note 14 infra with note 16 infra.
12 That is, provided that the unseaworthiness was attributable to the negligence of
the ship's master or owner. The early unseaworthiness cases were really wage cases in-
volving an implied condition to the mariner's wage contract, not a warranty on which
the shipowner would be liable for personal injury damages. Tetreault, supra note 4, at
386, 390.
18 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
14 This word, while originally coextensive with the word "crewman," later became
a distinct class to which the shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship extended. Sub-
sequent developments in admiralty law would result in the inclusion within the class of
"seamen" those who are not members of the crew.
15 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). "It is clear that the liability for 'unsea-
worthiness' which the Supreme Court mentioned and discussed in The Osceola was a
liability premised on negligence." Tetreault, supra note 4, at 391. See Smith, Liability in
the Admiralty for Injuries to Seamen, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 418, 425 (1906).
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to the seaworthiness of the ship, the Court refused to expand the ship-
owner's liability for negligence. The Court stated that members of
the crew" were fellow servants and hence the shipowner was not
liable to a crew member for negligent injury caused by another crew
member.'t Left undecided were the relationships between a "seaman"
and a "crewman" as well as between unseaworthiness and operating
negligence. The Osceola's progeny, culminating in Usner, sought reso-
lution of these issues.
As stated above, the shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness
under The Osceola was predicated upon negligence; the shipowner's
duty was to exercise ordinary care to provide a ship reasonably suited
for its intended voyage. In Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sanda'nger, 18 the
Court modified the shipowner's obligation, holding the shipowner to
an absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel; exercise of ordinary
care no longer satisfied the shipowner's duty." Thus began a trend,
continued in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.,2° which divorced unsea-
worthiness liability from concepts of negligence. In Mahnich, a sea-
man was injured in the collapse of a staging rigged with defective
rope which had been negligently selected while good rope was avail-
able. The Court found the ship unseaworthy and the shipowner. liable
on the basis of the defective rigging, without regard to the fact that the
unseaworthiness had been caused by the operating negligence of a
mate." This trend was climaxed in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer," where
a purely transitory condition, fish gurry on a rail, rendered the ship-
owner liable under the unseaworthiness doctrine to a seaman injured
as a result of the slippery condition.
A parallel development in the unseaworthiness decisions relevant
to a discussion of Usner concerns the extention to the harbor worker
of the seaman's remedy for unseaworthiness. The judicial process by
16
 In this context, the word "crew" refers generally to those men who may be termed
mariners. The crew "signs on" and subjects itself to the discipline of the ship. "Seaman,"
on the other hand, is a term which was subsequently given a broader scope than the term
"crew," and refers to both actual mariners and those related workers who perform tasks
historically maritime in nature. See p. 572 infra.
17 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). The Court stated that:
[Wle think the law may be considered as settled .. .
. • •
... [Mat all the members of the crew, except perhaps the master, are, as
between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover for injuries
sustained through the negligence of another member of the crew beyond the ex-
pense of their maintenance and cure.
Id.
18 259 U.S. 255 (1922). The respondent in this case was injured because the ship had
been improperly outfitted.
10 Id. at 259. Accord, The H.A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937). "Mlle lia-
bility for any injuries arising out of the neglect to supply a seaworthy vessel is not de-
pendent on the exercise of reasonable care but is absolute." Id. at 710.
20 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
21 Id. at 100.
22 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
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which this occurred appears to have been motivated by socio-economic
and humanitarian considerations." Harbor workers were left without
protection for job related injuries when the Court, in Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen," excluded harbor workers from the jurisdiction of state
workmen's compensation laws for constitutional reasons." The failure
of Congress to enact federal legislation designed to protect adequately
the injured harbor worker2° led the Court to act in what has been
termed a "frank incursion into legislation." 27 Thus, in International
Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,28 the Court defined the statutory term
"seaman" as including longshoremen, thereby entitling longshoremen
to recover under the Jones Act" against their employer for either the
latter's negligence or that of his employees." Harbor workers were
thus provided with some degree of protection against job related in-
jury.
The decision in Haverty was based on a misreading of congressional
intent," however, and a year later Congress responded with enactment
of the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act." Under the Act the longshoreman's exclusive remedy against his
employer was limited to a statutory compensation." Thus, while limit-
ing the longshoreman's right of recovery against his employer, the Act
did not affect the longshoreman's right of recovery against individuals
other than his employer. Although at the time this point was moot
since no right of recovery against others existed, later developments
in the expansion of rights of harbor workers would be dependent upon
limitation of the Act in this manner.
The right of the longshoreman to recover against one other than
his employer was subsequently recognized by the Supreme Court in
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki. 84
 The Court reasoned that the ship-
owner should not be allowed to escape his duty to provide a seaworthy
28 Tetreault, supra note 4, at 400.
24 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
23
 Id. at 212.
26 Two attempts at congressional amendment of the "saving to suitors' clause" of the
Judiciary Code, 40 Stat. 395 (1917) and 42 Stat. 634 (1922), were held unconstitutional
by the Court in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) and Washington
v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924), respectively.
27 Tetreault, supra note 4, at 401-02.
28 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
29 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
29 The Jones Act made applicable the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1970), which impose liability for negligence on the carrier.
Under the Jones Act the fellow servant rule is not a bar. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Skaggs,
240 U.S. 66, 70 (1916).
31 Mr. Justice Holmes stated that: "We cannot believe that Congress willingly would
have allowed the protection to men engaged upon the same maritime duties to vary with
the accident of their being employed by a stevedore rather than by the ship." 272 U.S.
at 52.
39 33 U.S.C. H 901-50 (1970).
22 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970).
34 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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ship by employing longshoremen to do labor which at one time would
have been performed by members of the crew." The Court concluded
that the shipowner's obligation was not confined to seamen who per-
form the ship's service under his immediate hire but that it also
extended to those "seamen" who render the ship's service with his
consent or by his arrangement." By applying to unseaworthiness
actions the definition of "seaman" which had been developed in the
context of Jones Act liability in International Stevedoring Co. v.
Haverty, the Court extended to harbor workers the seaman's tradi-
tional protection against unseaworthiness." The decision signaled the
opportunity for harbor workers to recover full compensation for in-
juries from one to whom the exclusive statutory recovery provisions
of the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act were inapplicable. •
Longshoremen's rights were further expanded in Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn.88
 In this case, a harbor worker was injured through the
negligence of a fellow servant." The injured longshoreman brought
a libel for damages against the shipowner, the negligent crewman's em-
ployer. In permitting recovery the Supreme Court concluded that
harbor workers, although "seamen" as regards unseaworthiness actions,
are not "crewmen" for purposes of negligence actions." Thus the
fellow servant rule announced in The Osceola, which, absent the Jones
Act, would bar crewmen from suing the shipowner for the negligence
of their fellow servants, is not a bar to an action by a harbor worker
against the shipowner for the negligence of the shipowner's employee.
In contrast to the majority position, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a con-
curring opinion argued that Sieracki had placed longshoremen in the
category of seamen for all purposes. Unwilling to make a distinction
between the use of the words "seaman" and "crew," Justice Frank-
furter argued that harbor workers should be considered members of
the crew for all purposes, including application of the fellow servant
rule to negligence actions.'
It is interesting to note that as a result of the Supreme Court's
benevolent interest in protecting the rights of harbor workers, these
individuals are presently graced with a wider range of remedies than
those available to crewmen, the true "wards of admiralty." Thus a
85 Id. at 100.
30 Id. at 95.
87 Id. at 100.
88 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
89 The fellow servant in this case was Hawn's own employer, who had been working
with Hawn as an employee of the shipowner.
4° Id. at 413.
41 346 U.S. 406, 414 (1953). Justice Frankfurter based his concurrence upon the
lower court's express finding of unseaworthiness. He reasoned that Hawn was within the
class of maritime workers denominated as seamen by Sieracki. However, Justice Jackson,
in dissent, was unwilling to indude Hawn within the class of seamen. Id. at 419.
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crewman can recover for unseaworthiness and, under the Jones Act,
for the negligence of a fellow servant. The harbor worker-seaman, on
the other hand, can recover against the shipowner for unseaworthiness,
for the negligence of a crewman under common law, and he is also
entitled to a statutory compensation from his employer." It was in
this context that Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. was decided.
II. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp.
Usner, a longshoreman employed by an independent stevedoring
contractor, was injured aboard the S.S. Edgar F. Luckenbach while
engaged in loading cargo." The ship, moored to a dock, was receiving
cargo from a barge positioned alongside. The loading operations were
being carried out by Usner and other longshoremen, under the direction
of their employer. Usner's job was to "break out," or load, the bundles
of cargo by securing the bundles to a sling attached to the fall each
time the fall was lowered from the ship's boom by the winch operator,
a longshoreman positioned aboard the ship. The loading proceeded
in this manner for some time, until the fall was not lowered far enough
by the winch operator on one occasion. Usner signaled the flagman
standing on the ship to direct the winch operator to lower the fall
further. The fall was lowered, but too far and too quickly. The sling
struck Usner, knocking him to the deck of the barge and injuring him.
Apparently the winch operator had been negligent in the operation of
the winch, since neither before nor after this incident was any difficulty
experienced in the operation of the winch, boom, fall, sling or other
equipment of the ship.
Usner brought an action for damages against the shipowner,
Luckenbach Overseas Corporation, in federal district court, alleging
that his injuries had been caused by the unseaworthiness of the ship.
Luckenbach moved for summary judgment on the ground that a single
negligent act by a longshoreman could not render the ship unsea-
worthy. The district court denied the motion but granted Luckenbach
leave to take an interlocutory appeal." The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and directed
that the motion for summary judgment be granted." The Circuit Court
ruled that " t[i]nstant unseaworthiness' resulting from 'operational
negligence' of the stevedoring contractor is not a basis for recovery
by an injured longshoreman!'" The Supreme Court granted certiorari
42 46 U.S.C. g 688 (1970).
42
 The facts here presented are substantially as stated in the Court's opinion. 400 U.S.
at 494-96.
44 28 U.S.C.
	
1292(b) (1970).
45
 Luckenbach Overseas Corp. v. Usner, 413 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1969).
46
 Id. at 985-86. Operating negligence may be defined as a momentary or transient
failure to exercise due care which does not affect the physical make-up of the ship. Un-
seaworthiness, under long-standing law, may result from operating negligence which
physically affects the ship and renders it not reasonably suited for its intended use.
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to consider the issue of whether operating negligence renders a ship
pro tanto unseaworthy.¢'
In denying recovery for the injury, and without reviewing in
detail the development of the doctrine of unseaworthiness in admiralty
law, the Court, in a five-four decision, accepted as fully settled (a)
that the shipowner's liability for an unseaworthy vessel extends beyond
the members of the crew and includes a longshoreman; (b) that the
shipowner is liable even though the unseaworthiness may be transitory;
and (c) that the shipowner is liable even though the injury be suffered
elsewhere than aboard ship. 48 The Court also observed that liability
for unseaworthiness has become "wholly distinct from liability based
upon negligence ... [because] unseaworthiness is a condition, and how
that condition came into being—whether by negligence or otherwise—
is quite irrelevant to the owner's liability for personal injuries result-
ing from it."4° Citing Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc." as climaxing
the case law evolution of the "complete divorcement of unseaworthiness
liability from concepts of negligence,"" the Court emphasized that in
all unseaworthiness cases there has existed a condition of unseaworthi-
ness." The condition might have arisen from a variety of circum-
stances, but in each instance the ship was not reasonably fit for her
intended service." The Court concluded, however, that:
What caused [Usner's] injuries in the present case .. .
was not the condition of the ship, her appurtenances, her
cargo, or her crew, but the isolated, personal negligent act of
[Usner's] fellow longshoreman. To hold that this individual
act of negligence rendered the ship unseaworthy would be to
subvert the fundamental distinction between unseaworthiness
and negligence that we have so painstakingly and repeatedly
emphasized in our decisions."
Usner had argued that the Court's per curiam decision in Mascuilli v.
United States" decided affirmatively the issue he raised concerning
operating negligence; specifically, that operating negligence per se ren-
47 Miler v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 397 U.S. 933 (1970). See Usner v. Lucken-
bach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 496 (1971).
48 400 U.S. at 497-98.
49 Id. at 498 (emphasis in original).
63 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
51 362 U.S. at 550.
82 400 U.S. at 499-500.
63 Id. at 499. The Court noted numerous conditions which have been held to give
rise to unseaworthiness. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) (defective
gear); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) (appurtenances in disrepair);
Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) (unfit crew) ; Waldron v Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724 (1967) (insufficient number of men assigned to per-
form a shipboard task); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369
U.S. 355 (1962) (improper loading or storage of ship's cargo).
54 400 U.S. at 500.
66 387 U.S. 237 (1967).
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dered a ship pro tanto unseaworthy. The majority rejected this argu-
ment, stating that reliance upon Mascuilli was misplaced."
The Mascuilli Court, in its per curiam treatment of the questions
posed in the petition for certiorari, had cited Mahnich v. Southern S.S.
Co." and Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser.58 The Usner Court, interpreting
the significance of the citation of these cases in Mascuilli, viewed
Mahnich as having involved a defective rope and Crumady, a defective
winch. The Usner majority concluded, therefore, that Mascuilli did not
support Usner's contention; Mascuilli had left unanswered the ques-
tion of whether operating negligence per se renders a ship pro tanto
unseaworthy."
Usner's contention was not so quickly dismissed by the dissenters."'
Mr. Justice Douglas considered the issue as having been settled in
Usner's favor in Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser. Justice Douglas, who
wrote the majority opinion in Crumady, relied on the facts of that
case for support. He argued that there the winch had not been in-
herently defective but rather, that it was the use of the winch in a
negligent and unsafe manner which had rendered the vessel unseawor-
thy. The conflicting interpretations placed upon Crumady by the Usner
majority and dissenting (minions indicates the significance of that
case with respect to the validity of the Usner rationale. An examination
of Crumady is therefore necessary.
In Crumady the cut-off safety device of a winch had been set by
members of the crew at twice the safe stress limit of the rigging. The
longshoremen then negligently moved the boom in a manner that caused
the stress on the rigging to exceed the maximum safe limit. The winch
continued to operate, failing to shut off as it would have if the safety
device had been properly set.° The Court found "ample evidence to
support the [lower court] finding that these stevedores did no more
than bring into play the unseaworthy condition of the vessel. The
winch---an appurtenance of the vessel—was not inherently defective
as was the rope in the Mahnich case. But it was adjusted . . . in a way
that made it unsafe and dangerous for the work at hand."62 The Court
concluded that "in this case the winch . . . makes the vessel pro tanto
unseaworthy."'"
It may be contended that if the boom and winch had been used
as intended the stress would not have reached, let alone exceeded, the
maximum safe stress. Arguably, then, the improper setting of the cut-
off device would not have been a cause of unseaworthiness; rather,
the unseaworthy condition resulted solely from the negligent use of
50 400 U.S. at 500 n.19.
57 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
55 358 U.S. 423 (1050).
as 400 U.S. at 500 n.19.
65 400 U.S. at 501.
01 358 U.S. at 425-26.
02 Id. at 427.
53 Id. at 428.
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sound equipment. However, the very existence of the safety device
indicates that its intended use was to prevent the stress on the boom
from exceeding the safe limit, regardless of the manner in which that
stress arose. Thus the safety device, once improperly set, was itself
no longer reasonably fit for its intended purpose, rendering the ship
pro tanto unseaworthy. Hence an unseaworthy condition existed which
allowed the subsequent negligence of the longshoremen to cause the
injury. The subsequent negligence of the longshoremen could not
have caused the injury if the ship had not already been unseaworthy.
The longshoremen's misuse of the sound winch and boom was thus
immaterial since, "but for" the defective condition of the safety device,
misuse of the winch and boom in this manner would not have been
possible. It appears, therefore, that the Usner majority's view of
Crumady as involving a condition rendering the ship pro tanto unsea-
worthy is supported by a close reading of the facts in that case.
Nonetheless, there is language in Crumady which may also sup-
port the dissenters' contention that stevedores may themselves render
a ship pro tanto unseaworthy. In fact, Crumady apparently gave ap-
proval to such a statement made by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in Grillea v. United States." This support for the dissenters' position
is mitigated, however, by the Supreme Court's refusal to decide the
issue in Crumady.°5 Furthermore, the facts of Grillea involved a con-
dition created by longshoremen rather than a single act of operational
negligence." Thus it would seem that the Usner dissenters are relegated
for support to dicta in Crumady and, perhaps, to the unexpressed in-
tent of Justice Douglas in that case."
The Usner majority, in contrast, appears to have construed
Crumady correctly. Since that case forms the basis of the decision
in Mascuilli, the Usner majority's interpretation of Mascuilli also ap-
pears to be correct. The correctness of the interpretation placed upon
Crumady and Mascuilli by the Usner majority does not, however,
resolve the question of the validity of the Court's distinction between
a condition of unseaworthiness and operating negligence. Thus, before
an analysis of related issues concerning the scope of unseaworthiness
can be undertaken, it must be determined whether the majority's dis-
tinction is correct.
III. UN SEAWORTHINESS AS A CONDITION
Admiralty law has long recognized the existence of a condition
of unseaworthiness when a vessel and her appurtenances are not rea-
sonably suited for their intended use. Quite naturally, this general
definition has also permitted the recognition of a wide variety of ship-
64 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
65 358 U.S. at 427. The Court stated that "we need not go so far . 
66 232 F.2d at 922 -23.
67 Much of Justice Douglas' dissent relies not upon what Crumady says, but upon
what the Justice had intended it to say.
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board circumstances as constituting conditions of unseaworthiness.
Thus it has been held irrelevant that the unseaworthiness arose as a
result of the "operating negligence" of a crewman." In Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., for example, a staging was negligently rigged with
defective rope by the mate even though good rope had been avail-
able." With the exception of an action maintainable under the Jones
Act," the injured crewman was precluded from recovering from the
shipowner under respondeat superior for the mate's negligence, due to
the bar of the fellow servant rule." The Supreme Court was of the
opinion, however, that the seaman should be able to recover in an
unseaworthiness action.72 Although no liability attached to the ship-
owner for negligent selection and use of the rope, the Court reasoned
that the defective rope made the staging itself "inadequate for the
purpose for which it was ordinarily used"" and hence, unseaworthy.
The Court concluded that the shipowner was under a continuing,
absolute duty to provide seaworthy appliances," a duty unaffected by
the fellow servant rule."
Just as it is immaterial that the unseaworthy condition was caused
by the operating negligence of a crew member, it is also immaterial
whether the operating negligence of longshoremen contributed to the
cause of the unseaworthy condition." Thus the Supreme Court in
Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser characterized the crew's setting of a safety
device at twice the maximum safe stress as the unseaworthy condition
which was subsequently brought into play by the longshoremen's
negligent use of the boom and winch."
Even if a defective appliance is brought aboard by the longshore-
men after the shipowner has relinquished control of the ship, as in
Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson," unseaworthiness liability may still be
imposed upon the shipowner. This result obtains because the duty of
the shipowner is absolute, continuing and nondelegable. 79 A defective
block brought aboard by the longshoremen in Petterson had been in-
corporated into the appurtenances of the ship. The shipowner's duty
to provide seaworthy appliances was expanded to include responsibility
58 See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
59 Id. at 97.
70 In Mahnich the statute of limitations had run. For a more detailed discussion of
the procedural development and strategy used in the case see Tetreault, Seamen, Sea-
worthiness, and the Rights of Harborworkers, 39 Cornell L.Q. 381, 396-98; G. Gilmore &
C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 317 (1957).
71 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
72 321 U.S. at 103.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 104.
75 Id. at 102.
75 See Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
" Id. at 427. See text at p. 575 supra.
78 347 U.S. 396 (1954), aff'g per curiam, 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953).
79 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 100 (1946) ; Mahnich v. Southern S.S.
Co., 321 U.S. 96, 102, 104 (1944) ; Tetreault, supra note 70, at 400-01.
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for this equipment. Thus, even if the longshoremen had been negligent
in bringing the defective equipment aboard, the shipowner was never-
theless liable; the defective block rendered the ship pro tanto unsea-
worthy."
Indeed, under the rationale of Mahnich, Crumady and Petterson
it would appear that it is immaterial by whom or in what manner
a portion of the ship is Tendered defective. This view is confirmed by
the opinion of the Supreme Court in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki."
In this case, a longshoreman was injured when the shackle supporting
a boom parted due to a latent defect. Although the contractor and sub-
contractor who had supplied the shackle were found liable on negli-
gence theory for their failure to test the fitting, 82 the shipowner was
also held liable on a theory of unseaworthiness." Thus it appears to
be irrelevant in an unseaworthiness action how the defective condition
arose. If the condition exists and it causes injury to a seaman, the
shipowner is held liable.
A further development in the shipowner's liability for unsea-
worthiness occurred in Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co." Certiorari
was granted" to resolve a conflict between the Fifth and Second
Circuit Court decisions in Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Boudoin86 and Keen
v. Overseas Tankship Corp." In Boudoin an American seaman sued
a shipowner in federal district court in order to recover for injuries
received in a shipboard attack by a drunken fellow seaman. On the
facts of the case, the district court had found that the assailant was
"a person of dangerous propensities and proclivities"" at the time
of the assault; that he was "a person of violent character, belligerent
disposition, excessive drinking habits, disposed to fighting and making
threats and assaults"; 89 and that he was not "equal in disposition and
seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling. . . ." 2° The district
court held the shipowner liable but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed o1 The Supreme Court found the owner liable, holding
that the warranty of seaworthiness extends to the crew as well as to
the ship and gear." The Court determined that the record sustained
88 Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478, 479-80 (9th Cir. 1953).
81 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
82 Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 57 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1944), rev'd in part and
aff'd in part, 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
88 Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
84 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
85 348 U.S. 814 (1954).
80 211 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1954), rev'd 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
81 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952). In Keen, the factual situation was almost identical to
that in Boudoin. The Second Circuit held that the malevolent crewman rendered this ship
pro tanto unseaworthy. The shipowner was therefore held liable to the crewman injured
in the attack.
88 Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 112 F. Supp. 177, 179 (E.D. La. 1953).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 180.
91 211 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1954).
82 348 U.S. 336, 339-40 (1955).
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the district court's findings and that the findings amply supported
a recovery for breach of the warranty of seaworthiness." As applied
to a crewman, such a warranty is not that the crewman is competent
to meet all contingencies, but that he is equal, in disposition and sea-
manship, to ordinary men in the calling. © 4 It would appear that a
longshoreman injured by a crewman under circumstances similar to
those in Boudoin would be entitled to recover for unseaworthiness,
since the duty of the shipowner to provide a seaworthy crew encom-
passes all seamen."
Just as misuse of a winch or other appliance may give rise to a
condition of unseaworthiness, so too may "misuse" of the crew result
in a condition in which the crew is not suited for its intended use;
improperly manned, the ship therefore would be unseaworthy. In
Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc." two crewmen had been
ordered by the third mate, during the last minute of a docking opera-
tion, to uncoil a heavy eight-inch rope and carry it fifty-six feet to
the edge of the ship. One of the two was injured while uncoiling the
rope and brought an action for unseaworthiness against the shipowners.
There was expert evidence to the effect that three or four men, rather
than two, were required to carry the line in order to constitute "safe
and prudent seamanship." The injured crewman did not contend that
the vessel as a whole was insufficiently manned nor that there were
too few men at the stern engaged in the overall docking operation.
Neither did he contend that the mate was incompetent, nor that the
rope was defective." The sole contention upon which he sought re-
covery was that "too few men assigned 'when and where' the job
of uncoiling the rope was to be done"" constituted unseaworthiness.
The Court agreed, holding that "[Ny assigning too few men to uncoil
and carry the heavy rope, the mate caused both the men and the
rope to be misused."" Citing Boudoin, the Court further stated that
the shipowner's duty was to provide a crew competent to meet the
contingencies of the voyage, thus rejecting the distinction made by
the Second Circuit between a well-manned ship and a well-manned
operation.'" It would appear that Waldron is broad enough to grant
recovery to a longshoreman who is injured when a rope carried by
too few crewmen is dropped, since the shipowner's duty to provide
a seaworthy crew encompasses all seamen.
It would also appear that Waldron and Boudoin may be viewed
93 Id. at 338, 340.
94 Id. at 340. Accord, Keen v. Overseas Tankahip Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir.
1952).
95 See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 100 (1946); Smith v. Lauritzen,
356 F•2d 171 (3d Cir. 1966).
96 386 U.S. 724 (1967).
57 Id. at 725.
55 Id, at 727.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 727 n.4. The duty, according to the Second Circuit, extended to the former
but not to the latter. Compare id. with 356 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1966).
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as establishing the rule that an incompetent crewman may so affect
the suitability of the crew to perform its intended service as to render
the ship unseaworthy. Moreover, if a single act of an incompetent
crewman, such as a violent attack on another crewman, may evidence
the unseaworthiness of the crew, it would seem likely that a continuous
course of negligent conduct by a crewman, when coupled with a negli-
gent act which results in injury, could provide a basis for an unsea-
worthiness recovery. In this instance the course of negligent conduct
engaged in by the crewman would be evidence of the incompetence
of the crew to meet the contingencies of the voyage and of the crew's
unsuitability for its intended service. The single negligent act which
causes injury to the seaman is not evidence of unseaworthiness per se
but it does serve to connect the injury with the existing unseaworthy
condition. The single act would establish the requisite causal connec-
tion between the unseaworthy condition of the crew, as evidenced by
the continuous course of negligent conduct on the part of a crewman,
and the injury to the seaman.
At this point it may be concluded that in each instance in which
a recovery for unseaworthiness has been permitted there has existed
a condition of unseaworthiness. In each of these cases the fact that
a physical part of the ship was not reasonably fit for its intended use
rendered the vessel pro tanto unseaworthy, regardless of the manner
in which this condition arose. Moreover, the crew, analogous to an
appurtenance of the ship, may be considered to be in an unseaworthy
condition when the crew members are not fit for their intended employ-
ment. In light of the Court's own precedents, the Usner majority's
statement that unseaworthiness is a condition appears justifiable.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp.
A. Two Views of the Majority Opinion
It is proposed that Usner should be interpreted as holding that
a single negligent act neither evidences nor constitutes an unseaworthy
condition. Furthermore, it is suggested that the shipowner's duty is
merely to provide a crew reasonably suited for its intended use and
a single negligent act is not evidence that the crew is not reasonably
fit. Central to this view is the conclusion that imposition of liability
upon the shipowner, under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, for a single
act of operating negligence by a crewman, would be an expansion of
the shipowner's duty from that requiring him to provide a reasonably
fit crew to one requiring him to provide an absolutely fit crew. A second
interpretation of Usner is that the shipowner's duty is to provide a rea-
sonably fit crew, not to provide reasonably fit seamen working on board,
but not members of the crew. The longshoreman who was operating
the winch was not a crewman and, therefore, the shipowner was under
no duty to the injured seaman for the acts of a noncrewman.'°1
101 400 U.S. at 500 n.18,
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The initial interpretation, however, does not consider this fact
to be determinative. Rather, the initial interpretation relies on the
Court's emphasis of the fact that unseaworthiness is a condition," 2
not an isolated act of operational negligence. The significant factor in
the initial view of the case is that although the winchman was opera-
tionally negligent, his negligence cannot be viewed as affecting the
suitability of the vessel or crew for their intended service, and, there-
fore, the single negligent act alone neither evidences nor constitutes
an unseaworthy condition. In contrast, the second view of the case
stresses the distinction that longshoremen are seamen but not crew-
men. A detailed analysis of the two views will reveal that the ship-
owner's liability for unseaworthiness is limited by the nature of his
duty and not by a strained reading of the word "crew."
B. An Analysis of the Two Views
It should be noted that the Court, by way of a footnote, indicates
that the winch operator was not a member of the ship's crew. 10" This
statement raises the troublesome question of whether the Court in-
tended to limit Usner to cases where injury is caused by the operating
negligence of one not a member of the crew, or whether the note was
merely dictum. In support of the latter alternative, it must be noted
that the sole issue to which the Court directed itself was whether a
single act of operating negligence evidenced an unseaworthy condi-
tion; 104
stress the distinction between longshoremen and crew aside from this
isolated, footnote comment. It would seem logical that a more complete
discussion of the attempted limitation would have been warranted
had the Court intended to limit its opinion to the conclusion that a
single act of negligence of a longshoreman, as contrasted to that of
a crew member, does not constitute an unseaworthy condition.
Furthermore, it is well established that the shipowner owes a duty
to all seamen. On the theory that longshoremen undertake the same
risks as crewmen in performing similar tasks, the shipowner has not
been allowed to escape liability by more efficient division of labor. 10°
Correspondingly, the shipowner should not be permitted to escape
liability for breach of his duty to provide a seaworthy crew by sub-
stituting longshoremen for crewmen who would otherwise perform the
tasks. In addition, Grillea and Cruinady indicate that a longshoreman's
negligence, which affects a physical part of the ship, may cause an un-
seaworthy condition and impose liability upon the shipowner. There-
fore it would be contrary to the rationale of Sieracki and its progeny
102 Id. at 498.
108 Id. at 500 n.18. See also Smith v. Olsen & Ugelstad, 324 F. Supp. 578, 582 (ED.
Mich. 1971).
104 400 U.S. at 496-500.
105 Id. at 500.
1°° Seas Shipping Co. v. Sternal, 328 U.S. 85, 100 (1946).
the Court concluded that it did not." 5 The Court did not
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to draw a distinction on the basis that a longshoreman is a seaman
but not a crewman. -
It is true that the crew "signs on" and does subject itself to the
rigid discipline of the sea, whereas a longshoreman does not. How-
ever, the shipowner's absolute duty to provide a reasonably fit crew
is not satisfied by the mere exercise of due care. He is liable for un-
known and perhaps unascertainable physical and psychological defects
in the crew."7 The fact that the crew members sign on and are subject
to examination by the shipowner before he accepts them and warrants
their seaworthiness is largely immaterial since the shipowner is liable
even though exercising due care in the selection process. Furthermore,
in reality, the extent of screening is minimal, due to union hiring
practices. Thus a refusal to extend the shipowner's liability to include
the acts of longshoremen, on the grounds that the shipowner has no
opportunity to examine the longshoremen and that he may therefore be
unfairly subjected to increased liability, ignores the realities of maritime
employment.'"
The final obstacle to interpreting Usner as holding that a single
negligent act neither constitutes nor evidences an unseaworthy con-
dition is presented by the holding of Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn. 10°
The case held that harbor workers, unlike crewmen, are not barred by
the fellow servant rule of The Osceola11° from suing the shipowner for
negligence." Hawn is readily reconcilable with the proposed interpre-
tation of Usner. Although longshoremen are not "crewmen" for pur-
poses of negligence actions brought against the shipowner, that is,
they are not his employees but his invitees, longshoremen may none-
theless be crewmen for purposes of the shipowner's liability in unsea-
worthiness actions. As a result of this employee-invitee distinction, the
shipowner is not liable for the negligence of his invitee, the longshore-
man, but he is held liable for the negligence of his employee, the crew-
man, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, providing that the
fellow servant rule does not apply.
The Court's refusal to apply the bar of the fellow servant rule to
longshoremen, who are not literally fellow employees, is consonant with
the narrow judicial interpretation historically given to the rule. 112
The shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship, on the other hand,
extends beyond his employees to a class of invitees who qualify as
seamen, that is, to those who perform tasks historically performed by
107 Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Keen v. Overseas Tank-
ship Corp., 194 F.2d .515 (2d Cir. 1952).
108 In addition, the shipowner may be entitled to indemnification from the steve-
doring contractor. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
100 346 U.S. 406 (1953),
110 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
111 346 U.S. at 413.
112 The refusal of the courts to apply the fellow servant rule to actions brought under
the Jones Act, supra note 30,. and to unseaworthiness actions, supra text accompanying
note 75, are illustrative of the narrow application of the rule.
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the crew. Furthermore, the shipowner's duty to provide a crew rea-
sonably fit for its intended service could logically include both crew-
men-employees, for whose negligence the shipowner may be liable, and
longshoremen-invitees, for whose negligence the shipowner may not be
liable, because liability for unseaworthiness has become completely
divorced from concepts of negligence. Unseaworthiness is a separate
cause of action.'" The duties owed in each cause of action, negligence
and unseaworthiness, may differ, as may the persons to whom the duties
are owed.
In the same manner, the persons for whose conduct the ship-
owner may be liable in negligence may differ from those who may
attach liability upon him for unseaworthiness. A prime example of this
distinction may be found in Sieracki. The contractors who supplied the
defective shackle could not render the shipowner liable under negligence
theory, but did impose upon him unseaworthiness liability. Thus those
who are not "crew" for purposes of the fellow servant rule in negligence
actions, may be crew for purposes of attaching unseaworthiness liability
upon the shipowner. Any difficulty with respect to the employee-
invitee distinction is one of nomenclature and not of substance. From
a conceptual point of view Usner can only be construed as meaning
that a single negligent act of a longshoreman neither evidences nor
constitutes an unseaworthy condition.
V. RELATED ISSUES ANALYZED IN LIGHT OF THE PROPOSED
INTERPRETATION OF Usner AND THE RATIONALE
SUPPORTING IT
Among the issues likely to arise under Usner is whether a single
act of operational negligence by a crewman may render the ship pro
tanto unseaworthy, thereby entitling an injured seaman to recover
from the shipowner. At first blush the issue appears to be moot.' A
longshoreman so injured may recover on a negligence theory under
Pope & Talbot v. Hawn" since he is not a crewman barred by the
fellow servant rule of The Osceola. 116 A crewman may sue his employer,
the shipowner, for negligence under the Jones Act.'" No procedural
advantage exists for an unseaworthiness action under these circum-
stances, since the proof required to establish unseaworthiness would
also establish negligence. However, an injured crewman might bring an
unseaworthiness action rather than a negligence action under these
circumstances, due to the existence, in the Jones Act of a statute of
limitations. No such time limitation would exist for an unseaworth-
iness action, and the issue, therefore, is not moot.'" The proposed
118 Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp.„400 U.S. 494, 500 (1971).
114 Pope & Talbott v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 418 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
118
 Id. at 406.
118 159 U.S. 158 (1903).
117 See text at p. 573 supra.
118 For an example of where the statute of limitations had lapsed, see Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). See also note 70 supra. But see Judge v. Johnston
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interpretation of Usner makes it clear that no distinction should be
made between the negligent act of a longshoreman and that of a crew-
man. Usner holds that a single negligent act of a longshoreman neither
constitutes nor evidences an unseaworthy condition; similarly, the
single negligent act of a crewman should neither constitute nor evidence
an unseaworthy condition.
In light of the proposed interpretation of Usner and the reasoning
supporting it, there remains the issue regarding the extent to which a
longshoreman may render a ship pro tanto unseaworthy. Perhaps
most significant is a factual situation, similar to that in Usner, in which
a negligent longshoreman injures a crewman. This situation, it is sub-
nlitted, would not give rise to a condition of unseaworthiness. Further-
more, the crewman could not sue the shipowner for negligence because
the longshoreman is not an employee or agent of the shipowner and
hence cannot impose liability upon the shipowner under the Jones Act.'
However, the crewman would be entitled to recover from the long-
shoreman's employer under common law negligence theory.
It would appear, under the logic of the proposed initial interpre-
tation, that a longshoreman with a volatile personality, who violently
attacks either a fellow longshoreman or a crewman, could render the
ship pro tanto unseaworthy and the shipowner liable."' In addition,
misuse of a longshoreman, resulting in an operation being improperly
manned, would impose liability upon the shipowner for unseaworthi-
ness. 121
 The same holds true for a longshoreman engaged in a con-
tinuous course of negligent conduct which would evidence his unsuit-
ability for the service to which he is put and, hence, both his un-
seaworthiness and that of the ship . 122
 In each case the malevolent or
misused longshoreman brings about an unseaworthy condition in the
crew, such that the crew is no longer reasonably suited for its intended
service. Since the longshoreman is not equal in disposition and seaman-
ship to ordinary men in the calling, his condition renders the ship pro
tanto unseaworthy.
CONCLUSION
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. may answer several ques-
tions regarding the scope of unseaworthiness liability. Usner should
not be interpreted as turning upon the fact that the longshoreman was
not a member of the crew and hence that the shipowner did not war-
Warren Lines, Ltd., 205 F. Supp. 700 (D. Mass. 1962).
119 The doctrine of respondeat superior under the common law theory of negligence
is inapplicable since a longshoreman, according to Hawn, is an invitee of the shipowner,
not an employee.
129 See Smith v. Lauritzen, 356 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1966) and textual discussion of
Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) and Keen v. Overseas Tankship
Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952), at p. 578 supra.
121 See discussion of Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724 (1967)
at p. 579 supra. Cf. Smith v. Lauritzen, supra note 120.
122 See discussion at p. 580 supra.
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rant his seamanship. Rather, Usner indicates that unseaworthiness is a
condition, and that a single negligent act, be it the act of a crewman
or a longshoreman, neither evidences nor constitutes such a condition.
Furthermore, longshorethen should be considered as part of the crew
for purposes of the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness given to
seamen. Thus, longshoremen could cause shipowner liability for unsea-
worthiness by engaging in a continuous course of negligent conduct;
by violently assaulting a seaman; or by being employed in a manner
causing an operation to be improperly manned. In each instance the
longshoreman's unsuitability for his intended service results in breach
of the shipowner's absolute duty to provide a seaworthy crew equal in
disposition and seamanship to ordinary men in the calling. Although
possessing potential for further confusion of the unseaworthiness doc-
trine, upon close examination the principal case offers answers to
several questions concerning the meaning of unseaworthiness. If pro-
perly interpreted by lower courts, the decision may introduce clarity
into the case law by placing emphasis upon unseaworthiness as a con-
dition.
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